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Abstract
Diffusion of responsibility across agents has been proposed to underlie decreased helping and increased aggression in
group behaviour. However, few studies have directly investigated effects of the presence of other people on how we
experience the consequences of our actions. This EEG study investigated whether diffusion of responsibility simply reflects
a post-hoc self-serving bias, or rather has direct effects on how we process the outcomes of our actions, and our experience
of agency over them. Participants made voluntary actions whose outcomes were more or less negative. Presence of another
potential agent reduced participants’ sense of agency over those outcomes, even though it was always obvious who caused
each outcome. Further, presence of another agent reduced the amplitude of feedback-related negativity evoked by outcome
stimuli, suggesting reduced outcome monitoring. The presence of other agents may lead to diffusion of responsibility by
weakening the neural linkage between one’s actions and their outcomes.
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Introduction
Social psychology has long recognised that the presence of
other people substantially influences behaviour. Perhaps the
most troubling example is the so-called ‘bystander effect’: the
presence of others reduces the likelihood that people will help
in an emergency situation or interfere with social norm viola-
tions (Darley and Latane, 1968; Chekroun and Brauer, 2002). A
much more common, and socially problematic effect is ‘social
loafing’. When a group of people has to work towards a collect-
ive goal, each individual on average puts in less effort than they
would when working alone (Karau and Williams, 1993).
Experimental studies also show that groups tend to make risk-
ier choices than individuals (Wallach et al., 1964; Bradley, 1995),
and behave more aggressively (Bandura et al., 1975; Meier and
Hinsz, 2004). All these situations have in common that individ-
ual behaviour is altered in social contexts. The presence of other
people makes agents feel less responsible for the outcome of
group decisions, especially those with negative consequences
(Mynatt and Sherman, 1975; Forsyth et al., 2002).
These findings have led to the concept of ‘diffusion of
responsibility’: the idea that the presence of others changes the
behaviour of the individual by making them feel less respon-
sible for the consequences of their actions (Bandura, 1991).
The diffusion of responsibility concept has great social, political
and moral importance, because it might constitute a form of
moral disengagement purported to explain inhumane actions
(Bandura, 1999). However, it remains unclear whether the mere
presence of others actually changes the experience of action
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and responsibility, or merely triggers a post-hoc bias in reports of
responsibility, to preserve self-esteem. In order to play a causal
role in group behaviour, diffusion of responsibility would need
to have ‘online’ influences on how people experience a given
situation, and not merely constitute a post-hoc narrative that in-
dividuals can use to explain outcomes after the fact. Few previ-
ous studies have focussed on potential ‘online’ mechanisms by
which the presence of other agents could influence the experi-
ence of action.
Sense of agency refers to the feeling that one can control
external events through one’s own actions. Sense of agency
plays a crucial role in social interactions (Frith, 2014), and is
therefore tightly linked to the experience and allocation of re-
sponsibility. Besides explicit self-reports of sense of agency, a
more objective, and implicit, measure of action-outcome pro-
cessing can be obtained using event-related potentials (ERPs).
The feedback-related negativity (FRN) is an ERP-component
associated with monitoring the consequences of action (see San
Martın, 2012 for a review). Importantly, this component is sensi-
tive to the perceived controllability of action outcomes: when
participants believe that an outcome is uncontrollable, the FRN
to negative outcomes is greatly reduced (Yeung et al., 2005; Li
et al., 2011). The FRN is also sensitive to the motivational signifi-
cance of outcomes (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd and
Yeung, 2012), potentially explaining the inverse relation be-
tween controllability and FRN amplitude. Uncontrollable out-
comes are less important to the agent, as they provide little
information on how to improve behaviour.
The presence of others may reduce sense of agency through
increased authorship ambiguity and an objective decrease in
control. For example, a joint grade for a group project provides
little information about the quality of individual contributions.
Accordingly, Li et al. (2010) showed that in a dice-tossing task,
FRN amplitude was reduced when, instead of tossing all three
dice, participants tossed only one, while the other dice were
tossed by other players. Therefore, the presence of other players
seemingly reduced participants’ control over the outcome by
two-thirds. However, diffusion of responsibility occurs even
when control is unaffected by the presence of others. In the
classic ‘bystander effect’ (Darley and Latane, 1968), the fact that
several people witness an emergency does not undermine the
capacity of one person to act and alter events. Thus, to explain
why the presence of others changes people’s behaviour, diffu-
sion of responsibility would have to influence an individual’s
experience of the situation, beyond objective effects on action-
outcome contingencies. Surprisingly, this possibility has been
largely neglected in the literature.
We propose that this reduction in sense of agency may be
mediated by the complexity of social decision-making com-
pared with individual decision-making. Difficulty, or dysflu-
ency, in decision-making has been shown to reduce sense of
agency for the outcome of the decision (for a review, see
Chambon et al., 2014). In social situations, one needs to consider
the potential actions of others. This makes action selection
more difficult. This complexity during ‘action selection’ might
then affect the processing of action outcomes, even if the out-
come monitoring itself is no more complex or demanding in so-
cial compared with non-social situations.
We investigated whether diffusion of responsibility might
arise because the individual sense of agency over actions and
outcomes is automatically reduced in the presence of alterna-
tive agents. Importantly, this social dilution of agency should
not simply reflect ‘ambiguity’ about who is responsible for the
outcome, nor changes in action-outcome contingencies. Rather,
it should represent a reduction in the impact or significance of
action outcomes in social vs non-social settings. To this end, we
designed an experiment with two agency conditions that dif-
fered only in terms of social context. This required: (i) action
consequences to be controllable, and (ii) attribution of outcomes
to the participant’s own actions to be unambiguous in both the
social and non-social context. Previous studies involved object-
ive decreases in control over outcomes, by eliminating response
choices (Yeung et al., 2005) or by having others act in addition to
the participants (Li et al., 2010). In contrast, our goal was to en-
sure that participants had ‘objectively’ the same amount of con-
trol in social and non-social contexts, thus we designed a task
in which action-outcome contingencies were stable across the
experiment, and participants were instructed accordingly.
We used a task in which a marble rolls down a bar, and an
action is required to stop it from crashing (Schel et al., 2014).
In our version of this task, participants either played alone or al-
legedly together with another player. If the participant acted,
the marble stopped immediately, so they could unambiguously
attribute the outcome to their own action. As the diffusion of re-
sponsibility concept is mostly used to explain behaviour in situ-
ations where acting is somehow costly or effortful, or results in
negative consequences, we designed the task to exclusively pro-
duce negative outcomes. Stopping the marble incurred some
cost for the participant, but this cost was avoided if the other
player stopped the marble. ERPs were recorded in response to
the outcome: visual feedback of the points lost on each trial.
Importantly, outcome presentation was separated in time from
the immediate action feedback of the marble stopping.
Therefore, participants already knew whether they would lose
some points due to their own action before the outcome was
presented. This ensured that the complexity of the outcome
processing phase was not affected by the presence or absence
of the other player. Participants then rated how much control
they felt over the outcome using a visual analogue scale.
Finally, our analyses focused on trials in which participants suc-
cessfully stopped the marble, so that the ‘only’ difference be-
tween social conditions was whether a potential alternative
agent was present or not.
We predicted that the presence of an alternative agent
would not only influence behaviour (as participants might rely
on the other player to act), but also reduce sense of agency. We
further reasoned that reduced agency might either reflect a re-
duction in the immediate subjective experience of control, or
merely a post-hoc justification due to a self-serving bias to blame
others for one’s misfortunes. The FRN component to the out-
come should be reduced in the former case, but not in the latter.
Materials and methods
Participants
Previous studies investigating ERPs in relation to control over
outcomes or sense of agency employed sample sizes of 16–20
participants (Li et al., 2010, 2011; Ku¨hn et al., 2011; Timm et al.,
2014). Given that the manipulation of social context in the ab-
sence of objective condition differences has not been investi-
gated previously, we aimed for a minimum sample size of 25.
To allow for dropouts, we tested 32 healthy student volunteers
(16 male, 16 female; age 18–32). The data of one participant were
lost due to technical failure. The data of three other participants
were excluded from data analysis because they spontaneously
expressed suspicion about the co-player’s participation in the
task in the post-experimental questionnaire. For one
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participant, strong noise in the EEG signal resulted in the rejec-
tion of more than 80% of trials, and therefore this participant’s
data were excluded from analysis as well. Thus, data of 27 par-
ticipants (12 male, 15 female) was included in the analyses.
Apparatus and materials
Participants were tested in pairs. Stimuli were presented on two
identical computer screens for the two participants.
Participants gave responses using standard computer mice.
After the task, participants filled out a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire probing for suspicion concerning the participation of
the co-player in the task, as well as the Locus of Control Scale
by Rotter (1966), and the subscales ‘Diffuse Responsibility’ and
‘Exercised Responsibility’ of the Ascription of Responsibility
Questionnaire (Hakstian et al., 1986).
EEG was recorded from 26 channels using g.tec g.USB ampli-
fiers with active ring electrodes and non-abrasive conductive gel.
Horizontal and vertical eye movements were recorded simultan-
eously. EEG signals were referenced online against the left ear-
lobe and were recorded with a 0.1 Hz Butterworth highpass filter.
Design and procedure
Participants were invited to the laboratory in mixed-gender
pairs of two. They received instructions together, filled out con-
sent forms for participation in the study and were then seated
in adjoining laboratories for the testing. During the instructions,
participants were assigned one avatar (Designed by
Freepik.com), which would represent them during the task.
They were also shown their co-player’s avatar, which would be
used when they played together. Both participants performed
the task simultaneously, but separately. After the task was fin-
ished, participants filled out post-experimental questionnaires
and personality questionnaires (see ‘Materials and methods’
section earlier). Participants were then fully debriefed and paid
for their participation. Payment consisted of £7.50 per hour,
plus any earnings from the task. To earn money from the task,
participants were given monetary points at the beginning of the
experiment, some of which they would lose in every trial. They
were then paid according to how many points they managed to
save (see task description below for details).
The marble task was designed to create a situation in which
acting was costly, but withholding action was potentially more
costly still. In each trial, participants had to stop a rolling mar-
ble from falling off a tilted bar, and crashing (see Figure 1).
Participants were instructed that, at the beginning of each
block, they would receive 1500 points worth 150 pence, and in
each trial they could lose up to 100 of these points. The task
consisted of 4 blocks of 30 trials each. Trials were randomly as-
signed to either the ‘Alone’ or the ‘Together’ condition, with 15
trials per condition and block.
In the beginning of an ‘Alone’ trial, participants saw their
own avatar alone, indicating they would be playing by them-
selves, while their co-player supposedly played simultaneously
on his/her computer. Next, they saw a blue marble lying on top
of a tilted bar, which after 500 ms started rolling down towards
the lower end of the bar. At any point, participants could press
the left mouse button to stop the marble. If they did so, the mar-
ble stopped in its current position, providing immediate feed-
back of their successful action. If participants did not react in
time, the marble rolled off the bar and crashed. The final pos-
ition of the marble, whether stopped or crashed, was shown for
500ms, followed by the presentation of a fixation cross for 1500–
2500 ms. In either case, participants received information about
how many points they lost, i.e. the action outcome, for 2000 ms.
ERPs were time-locked to outcome presentation. Afterwards, a
fixation cross was presented for 500 ms and then participants
saw a visual analogue scale with the question ‘How much con-
trol did you feel over the outcome?’ and the end points of the
scale labelled ‘No control’ and ‘Complete control’. Participants
used the mouse to indicate how much control they felt they had
over the number of points lost during that trial. It was empha-
sized during instructions that ‘outcome’ meant the number of
points participants lost on a given trial, irrespective of whether
the marble crashed.
Participants were instructed that the later they stopped the
marble, the fewer points they would lose. In order to make it dif-
ficult to always stop the marble at the very end of the bar, the
speed with which the marble rolled down the bar varied from
trial to trial. Also, at some point along the bar, the marble would
speed up, and this point varied from trial to trial. This added a
risk component to the task, since if the participant waited too
long, the marble might suddenly speed up and they might not
be able to stop it in time to prevent a crash. There was also un-
certainty about the outcome, as the exact number of points lost
could not be fully predicted from the marble stopping position.
In fact, the bar was divided into four different payoff sections of
equal length (60–46 points at the top; 45–26 and 25–16 points in
the middle; 15–1 points at the end). If the marble crashed, 70–99
points would be lost. Within each section, the number of points
lost was varied randomly from trial to trial.
At the beginning of ‘Together’ trials, participants saw their
own avatar next to the avatar of their co-player, and the marble
in these trials was coloured green. Participants were instructed
that, in these trials, both players would be playing together and
either could use their mouse button to stop the marble. If nei-
ther player acted, the marble would crash and both players
would lose the same number of points. If the co-player stopped
the marble, the participant would not lose any points. If the par-
ticipant stopped the marble, they would lose a number of points
according to the position where they stopped it, and their co-
player would not lose any points.
In fact, participants were playing alone in all trials, and the
co-player’s behaviour was simulated by the computer. The co-
player’s behaviour was programmed such that participants had
to stop the marble in the majority of ‘Together’ trials, to ensure
a sufficient number of artefact-free trials was available for ERP
analyses. If participants had stopped the marble more often
than their co-player, and if participants did not act sooner, the
co-player could stop the marble along the lower half of the bar.
In that case, the marble would stop on its own, and participants
received feedback of losing zero points. To avoid ambiguity
about who caused the outcome, simultaneous actions of both
participant and co-player were attributed to the participant.
Thus, if the participant acted within 50 ms of a simulated co-
player action, this would count as participant’s action, and feed-
back would indicate a loss according to the stop position1.
ERP pre-processing
EEG-signals were processed using the Matlab-based open-
source toolbox eeglab (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) with the
ERPlab plugin (Lopez-Calderon and Luck, 2014).
The continuous EEG signal was notch-filtered and re-
referenced to the averaged signal of the left and right mastoids.
The signal was then cut into 3000 ms epochs time-locked to the
presentation of the outcome. Independent component analysis
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was used to remove eye movement artefacts. A 0.5 Hz highpass
filter (FIR filter, cutoff frequency 0.25 Hz) and a 20 Hz lowpass fil-
ter (FIR filter, cutoff frequency 22.5 Hz) were applied. Epochs
with signal artefacts were removed using an 80 mV threshold.
EEG signals were then averaged into ERPs separately for the two
experimental conditions, using a 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline.
This resulted in an average of 39.25 (SD ¼ 7.10) trials for the
Alone condition (min ¼ 20), and average 32.96 (SD ¼ 9.30) trials
for the Together condition (min ¼ 16).
The FRN component was analysed as the mean amplitude
between 250-330 ms, at electrode FCz, based on previous studies
(Yeung et al., 2005; Li et al., 2011) and observation of grand ERPs
and scalp topography.
Data analysis
We analysed agency ratings and ERPs only for trials where the
participant acted and successfully stopped the marble.
Behavioural data (stopping position, outcomes, and agency rat-
ings) and mean FRN amplitude were analysed using hierarchical
linear regression models (i.e. linear mixed-effects models). This
approach is advisable with unbalanced data, and allowed us to
model single trial data (Bagiella et al., 2000; Baayen et al., 2008;
Tibon and Levy, 2015). Models included the condition as a pre-
dictor, coded as Alone ¼ 0, Together ¼ 1. Where relevant,
Stopping Position and Outcome were also included as covariates,
after standardising the values within participants. All fixed ef-
fects were also modelled as participant random effects (random
intercepts and slopes). Analyses were conducted using the lme4
package (Bates et al., 2014) in R Core Team (2015). Parameter esti-
mates (b) and their associated t-tests (t, p), calculated using the
Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of freedom (Kuznetsova
et al., 2015), are presented to show the magnitude of the effects,
with bootstrapped 95% CIs (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994).
Moreover, we analysed behavioural data (proportion of tri-
als, agency ratings, and mean outcomes) from trials in which
the marble crashed. ERP data for these trials were not analysed,
however, due to low trial numbers. Finally, for together trials
only, we compared the proportion of trials in which the co-
player acted, relative to the marble crashing.
Results
Behaviour
The main focus of our analyses was trials in which the partici-
pant successfully stopped the marble. These trials were the
same across the two social context conditions, but differed only
in that participants acted while knowing that their co-player
‘could have acted instead’ of them in the together condition.
To assess how participants’ behaviour varied across social con-
texts, we modelled the position at which the marble was
stopped. Participants stopped the marble significantly later in
the together condition, relative to playing alone [b ¼ 3.18, t(833.30)
¼ 5.85, P < 0.001, 95% CI¼ (2.12, 4.26), see Supplementary Table
S1 for full results table]. This suggests that participants waited
longer to act in the together condition to allow time for their co-
player to act instead of them.
Outcome (number of points lost) was predicted from the so-
cial context factor, stop position covariate, and their interaction.
Outcomes were related to the marble stop position [b ¼ 6.12,
t(31.88) ¼ 22.54, P < 0.001, 95% CI¼ (5.63, 6.62)], with later stops
resulting in smaller losses, as expected based on the task de-
sign. The social context did not influence outcomes [b ¼ 0.094,
t(31.98) ¼ 0.30, P ¼ 0.77, 95% CI¼ (0.51, 0.78)], nor did the social
context by stop position interaction [b¼0.43, t(69.96)¼1.45, P
¼ 0.15, 95% CI¼ (1.00, 0.14), see Supplementary Table S2]. This
shows that outcomes were similar across social contexts, for tri-
als in which the participant successfully stopped the marble.
Finally, agency ratings were modelled using social context,
stop position, and outcome, plus their interactions. Results
showed a significant reduction in agency ratings when
playing together, relative to playing alone [b¼4.74,
t(22.66)¼3.57, P ¼ 0.002, 95% CI¼ (7.260, 2.29); see Figure 2a].
Agency ratings were also predicted by the outcome [b ¼ 4.14,
t(24.52) ¼ 4.63, P < 0.001, 95% CI¼ (2.21, 5.61)], with smaller losses
being associated with higher ratings (see Supplementary Figure
S1a). Finally, agency ratings were significantly influenced by the
marble stopping position [b ¼ 2.73, t(22.66) ¼ 3.03, P ¼ 0.006, 95%
CI ¼ (0.77, 4.65)], with later stops being linked to higher ratings
(see Supplementary Figure S1b). There were no significant inter-
actions (see Supplementary Table S3).
Fig. 1. Marble task. Figure shows the outline of a low-risk successful trial (A), a high-risk successful trial (B), and an unsuccessful trial (C). Note that C is the worst out-
come, B the best, and A the intermediate. Social context was indicated at the start of a trial, by either presenting the participant’s own avatar alone, or together with
the other player’s avatar. The marble colour served as a reminder of social context, and was either blue in the alone condition (shown here), or green in the together
condition. In the together condition, besides the trials displayed here, there were trials in which the ‘other’ player stopped the marble, and the participant did not lose
any points. ERPs were time-locked to outcome presentations of successful trials (A and B, marked in bold) in which the participant stopped the marble.
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To check whether participants might have always reported
less control in the together condition, agency ratings were ana-
lysed specifically in trials in which the marble crashed. Agency
ratings were modelled by the social context, the outcome, and
their interaction. When the marble crashed, results showed
that only the outcome—how many points were lost—influenced
agency ratings [b ¼ 2.28, t(25.07) ¼ 2.25, P ¼ 0.034, 95% CI¼ (0.39,
4.37)], with higher ratings associated with smaller losses. Social
context no longer predicted agency ratings [b ¼ 0.36, t(25.57) ¼
0.23, P ¼ 0.82, 95% CI¼ (2.52, 3.55)], and there was no signifi-
cant social context by outcome interaction [b ¼ 0.47, t(26.72) ¼
0.30, P ¼ 0.77, 95% CI¼ (2.66, 3.70)]. We further checked that ac-
cording to the task design, outcomes did not differ, on average,
across social contexts [Alone: mean¼85.06, SD ¼ 2.92;
Together: mean¼85.41, SD ¼ 3.29; paired samples t-test: t(26) ¼
0.38, P ¼ 0.71]. Therefore, the relation between agency ratings
and social context described earlier was specifically related to
those trials in which the participant successfully acted.
To fully characterise participants’ behaviour in the task, we
also analysed number of trials in which the marble crashed,
and in which the ‘Other’ agent acted instead (in the together
condition). The marble crashed significantly more often in the
alone condition (mean ¼ 20.47%, SD ¼ 8.63), than when playing
together [mean ¼ 15.00%, SD ¼ 6.57; paired samples t-test: t(26) ¼
3.73, P < 0.001]. In the together condition, the co-player acted
significantly more often (mean ¼ 19.44%, SD ¼ 8.62) than the
marble crashed [paired samples t-test: t(26) ¼ 4.05, P < 0.001].
These results, together with the earlier finding of later stops in
the together condition, show that participants adapted their be-
haviour in order to minimise their losses in the together condi-
tion, when the "co-player" could act instead of the participant.
To assess whether this strategy really was beneficial, we aver-
aged the outcomes across all trials (successful stops, marble
crashes and ‘co-player’ actions) for each participant. Results
confirmed that, overall, participants lost significantly less
points in the together condition (mean¼21.10, SD ¼ 3.76),
relative to playing alone [mean¼28.17, SD ¼ 4.06; paired sam-
ples t-test: t(26) ¼ 6.84, P < 0.001]. Since the comparisons above
showed no significant differences in outcomes across social
contexts for successful stops, nor for marble crashes, this
overall reduction in losses was clearly driven by the ‘co-player’
action trials, in which the participant did not lose any points.
ERPs
Mean amplitudes for the FRN component were analysed with
the same model as agency ratings. Results revealed that FRN
amplitude was significantly reduced (i.e. more positive) when
playing together, relative to the alone condition [b ¼ 1.26, t(188.52)
¼ 2.40, P ¼ 0.017, 95% CI¼ (0.042, 2.28); see Figure 3]. FRN ampli-
tude was not significantly influenced by the outcome [b ¼ 0.18,
t(50.58) ¼ 0.37, P ¼ 0.71, 95% CI ¼ (0.83, 1.23)], nor by stop pos-
ition [b¼0.53, t(28.02)¼1.00, P ¼ 0.32, 95% CI¼ [1.56, 0.53)].
There were no significant interactions (see Supplementary
Table S4).
Discussion
To investigate the cognitive and neural consequences of diffu-
sion of responsibility, we developed a task in which participants
either played alone, or together with another agent who could
act instead of them. The best outcome for the participant
occurred if they refrained from acting, but the co-player acted.
The worst outcome occurred if neither participant acted. The
co-player’s presence led participants to act later, reduced their
subjective sense of agency, and also attenuated the neural pro-
cessing of action outcomes, as reflected by the FRN.
Behaviour
In the ‘Together’ condition, participants acted later and rated
their feeling of control over action outcomes as lower, com-
pared with ‘Alone’ trials. Importantly, participants had the
same objective control over outcomes in ‘Alone’ and ‘Together’
trials. Further, the social context varied randomly between tri-
als. Therefore, our results show that behavioural decisions and
sense of agency are continuously updated by social context
information.
In accordance with studies using implicit measures of
agency (Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie and Haggard, 2013), we
found that sense of agency was reduced for more negative out-
comes. This shows that, as instructed, participants rated their
Fig. 2. Behavioural results. (a) Parameter estimates for the model predicting agency ratings, with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Condition refers to the effect of
social context (Alone ¼ 0 vs Together ¼ 1), such that a negative parameter estimate denotes a loss of agency in the Together condition. (b) Mean agency ratings for the
two experimental conditions, showing a significant reduction in agency ratings in Together trials. (c) Mean position at which participants stopped the marble for the
two experimental conditions, showing a significant delay of actions in Together trials. Error bars show standard error of the mean.
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subjective sense of control over the number of points they lost,
rather than over whether the marble crashed. Reduced sense of
agency over more negative outcomes could reflect the self-
serving bias of attributing negative outcomes to external factors
(Bandura, 1999). However, outcome magnitude effects in the
‘Together’ condition were no larger than in the ‘Alone’ condi-
tion, suggesting that social diffusion of responsibility does not
simply reflect a misattribution of negative outcomes to others.
FRN
ERP results showed an effect of social context on the neural pro-
cessing of action outcomes. In otherwise identical trials, FRN
amplitude to outcomes of successful actions was reduced by the
co-player’s presence. Interestingly, we observed these effects on
absolute amplitude of the FRN, rather than the commonly used
difference wave between processing of positive and negative
outcomes.
The FRN has been shown to be sensitive to distribution of
control among multiple players (Li et al., 2010), and to partici-
pants’ beliefs regarding whether outcomes are controllable
(Yeung et al., 2005; Li et al., 2011). In our task, instructions about
action-outcome contingencies were identical between
conditions, and full control remained with the participant.
Thus, the mere presence of another player was sufficient to
evoke changes in the neural processing of action outcomes akin
to those observed when control over an outcome is abolished.
As such, our EEG findings offer an objective measure consistent
with subjective agency ratings. Attentional demands during the
outcome processing were identical for ‘Alone’ and ‘Together’ tri-
als. The FRN is thought to be sensitive to the motivational sig-
nificance of outcomes (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd
and Yeung, 2012). While in our task there was no ‘objective’ re-
duction in control over outcomes in ‘Together’ trials, partici-
pants nevertheless reported feeling less control over outcomes
when the other player was present. Thus, the motivation to
learn from such outcomes could be weakened, leading to
reduced outcome monitoring.
Importantly, at the beginning of the outcome phase, partici-
pants knew they would lose a certain number of points, de-
pending on where they stopped the marble. Therefore,
participants’ expectations could be assumed to be identical in
Alone and Together trials. At the beginning of Together trials,
participants may have anticipated the possibility of a better out-
come (losing no points), than at the outcome of Alone trials.
However, if this affected their outcome processing after they
made an action, this should result in a larger FRN amplitude, as
there would be a greater negative mismatch between antici-
pated and actual outcome.
Implications for concepts of diffusion of responsibility
Our findings significantly extend current models of diffusion of
responsibility (Bandura, 1999), by demonstrating an online ef-
fect of social context on outcome processing. This is in line with
Bandura’s proposition that negative consequences of one’s ac-
tions are less relevant in a group than in an individual context
(Bandura, 1999). Social context might reduce the experience
that actions are linked to their consequences. Bandura (1991)
distinguishes diffused responsibility and distorted processing of
action consequences as independent causes of reduced subject-
ive responsibility. Our findings suggest that these phenomena
could be related. Specifically, the presence of another agent can
attenuate the processing of action outcomes, potentially leading
to reduced sense of agency and responsibility. Consistently,
coercion reduces sense of agency and attenuates the sensory
processing of action outcomes (Caspar et al., 2016).
Fig. 3. ERPs. Grand average time courses are shown for the two experimental conditions. The analysed time window for the FRN (250–330 ms) is highlighted in grey.
Topoplot shows the scalp distribution of the difference between the conditions averaged across the FRN time window.
Fig. 4 The model shows different ways in which the presence of others may in-
fluence outcome monitoring and sense of agency. The pathways in black show
mechanisms which can explain findings of previous studies, but are, as we
show in this study, not necessary for diffusion of responsibility to occur. The
central pathway (in red) shows the mechanism we propose, which can explain
the observed effects in the absence of ambiguity and post-hoc justification.
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The mechanisms underlying these effects remain unclear.
Dysfluency in action selection has been shown to reduce sense
of agency (Chambon et al., 2014). Mentalising about potential be-
haviour of an alternative agent may increase the complexity of
decision-making, and increase uncertainty about possible scen-
arios. We propose that such decision-making dysfluency may
play a causal role in diffusion of responsibility as shown in
Figure 4. Deciding whether to act is harder when someone else
might also intervene, compared with when acting alone. We
suggest that the need to mentalise in social contexts would
complicate action selection, which in turn reduces sense of
agency when one does act.
We designed our task to eliminate ambiguity in agency attri-
bution, that is, about ‘who’ caused a given outcome. In real-life
social situations, attribution of outcomes is likely to be more
ambiguous than in comparable non-social situations. Reduced
monitoring of action consequences due to the presence of
others may then increase the likelihood of attribution errors.
Correctly attributing consequences to their causes; however, is
a critical prerequisite for learning action-outcome associations
and likely also for forming a sense of moral responsibility. In
this sense, the social dilution of agency might potentially have
both immediate and longer-term effects on agency learning.
Conclusions
We show that diffusion of responsibility is not merely a post-hoc
phenomenon reflecting a self-serving bias, but an online influ-
ence on how people process and experience the consequences
of their actions. The presence of other agents can lead to
reduced outcome monitoring and a reduction in individual
sense of agency, even in the absence of attributional ambiguity.
Distributed responsibility could potentially also cause differ-
ences in attentional demands or differences in outcome expect-
ations. These effects could be mediated by increased
complexity of decision-making processes in social situations.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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